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The Takings Clause and Partial 
Interests in Land 
ON SHARP BOUNDARIES AND CONTINUOUS 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Richard A. Epstein† 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this conference—Post-Zoning: Alternative 
Forms of Public Land Use Controls—is fitting for the David 
Trager Symposium. David was a close friend of mine, and 
during the years that he was dean, he brought me to New York 
City and Brooklyn Law School to speak about the question of 
rent control, which I attacked in my usual blunt fashion.1 The 
question of land use regulation is to some extent orthogonal to 
the rent control question—which deals with financial matters 
rather than with physical externalities between adjacent, and 
not so adjacent, landowners. I have no question that market 
solutions work far more smoothly for financial relations 
between landlord and tenant than they do for physical 
interactions among strangers. There is no need for a law of 
nuisance to regulate financial interactions among various 
rights holders. But there is, decidedly, that need when dealing 
with disputes between ordinary landowners. The law of 
nuisance is the relevant body of law, and its development long 
antedates the rise of Progressive legal theory.2  
  
 † Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; 
the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; the James 
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and senior lecturer, The University 
of Chicago. I should like to thank participants at the University of Chicago Work-in-
Progress Workshop of January 3, 2013 for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper, and Jordana Haviv, Benjamin Margo, and Joshua Stanton, NYU Law School, 
class of 2014 for their valuable assistance on earlier drafts of this article.  
 1 Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to 
Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1281 (1989).  
 2 See Joel Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 403 (1974).  
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Put more generally, no one could possibly argue—and I 
have not argued3—that all forms of liability and regulation 
should have no role to play in land use disputes. But that 
necessary concession to state power does leave open the 
question of exactly which forms of regulation should be 
imposed, and how. In dealing with this question, I take the 
general approach that any system of weak property rights will 
necessarily lead to political mischief. The definition of a weak 
property right for these purposes is one whose validity depends 
on the complex interaction of multiple variables, each of 
uncertain weight. The adoption of this approach quickly drives 
courts toward a view that the determination of rights depends 
on the reasonableness of certain conduct under the 
circumstances. In the absence of any strong theory of property 
rights, courts tend to show extreme deference to the decisions 
of legislatures and administrative agencies. The actions of 
these groups, however, are vulnerable to political intrigue that 
can shift certain key property rights—such as the right to 
develop land—back and forth between individuals in an ad hoc 
fashion. Some measure of stability is found in the takings 
law—under the key decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp.4—insofar as it adopts a rule of per se 
compensation for cases of direct government occupation. But 
the law of regulatory takings—those challenges dealing with 
government regulation that restricts the power of property 
owners to use, develop, or alienate their land—is governed by 
the decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City,5 which takes a self-conscious pride in insisting that only 
“ad hoc” rules are capable of resolving challenges to government 
regulation under the Takings Clause.6 
The great vice in takings law lies in the abandonment of 
principled adjudication in regulatory takings cases. The 
argument here is that the correct set of bright-line rules will 
reduce the level of discretion afforded to land use regulators, 
such that the secure property rights created will lead to higher 
levels of investment and, as a result, higher overall levels of 
  
 3 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Central to Lingle: The Long 
Backwards Road, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593 (2007). 
 4 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).  
 5 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 6 Id. at 123-24. 
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social welfare.7 The recognition that property rights have, in 
many instances, sharp boundaries imposes clear extrinsic 
limitations on what it is that legislatures and administrative 
agencies can do with respect to those rights. This argument is 
not intended to say that there are no difficult takings cases. 
The full system of takings requires the incorporation of two 
further elements. The first deals with implicit in-kind 
compensation and the second with the state’s exertion of the 
police power. First, in ordinary takings cases, the compensation 
supplied to a landowner is in cash. But there is in principle no 
reason why that compensation could not be supplied in-kind. 
That in-kind compensation is critical in understanding any 
complex zoning scheme that simultaneously imposes both 
benefits and burdens on all its members. In some cases, the 
benefits from the scheme are compensation for the burdens 
that it imposes on all its members. That outcome usually holds 
when the gains and burdens are proportionate across all 
players. In other cases, the skew between benefits and burdens 
indicates that cash compensation may still be required to make 
up for shifts in wealth between the parties. Second, the 
traditional police power inquiry is whether the government 
taking of property is justified under the police power as a 
means to protect “the safety, health, morals, and general 
welfare of the public [at large].”8 This formulation was applied, 
controversially, in Lochner v. New York.9 In this article, I shall 
not dwell on those cases because the issues that I address 
involve categorical mistakes in analysis by the Supreme Court 
that implicate neither of these central concerns to the overall 
structure of the law. 
What is relevant from the earlier work is the continued 
insistence that it is only possible to develop a consistent view of 
public law by following the sound articulation of private law 
  
 7 I have developed this theme in greater detail in Richard A. Epstein, The 
Property Rights Decisions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: When Pragmatic Balancing 
Is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 177 (2012). 
 8 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 3, at 107-45 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9 See 198 U.S. at 53 (“There are, however, certain powers, existing in the 
sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the 
exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those 
powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific 
limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public. Both 
property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the 
governing power of the State in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions 
the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere.”). 
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principles. In this regard, a sound body of takings law should 
follow the appropriate formula for a sound body of private law, 
which, when properly formulated, relies on clear boundary 
lines to determine who is entitled to do what.10 The decision to 
offer compensation in takings cases, like the decision to offer 
compensation in tort law, should be governed by bright-line 
rules. By the same token, the amount of compensation awarded 
for the taking should vary continuously with the amount of the 
loss inflicted on the owner. In this regard, the public law differs 
from the private law, insofar as governments are authorized to 
make takings for public use, and thus need only compensate for 
the owner’s loss and do not have to make restitution for the 
public gain.  
In short, to make takings law more principled and 
predictable, a continuity between torts and takings is central to 
the overall operation of the system. As will become evident, 
however, that principle is widely rejected, most notably in the 
Court’s flooding cases, which are an example of the incongruent 
distinction between permanent and temporary takings.11 A 
similar weakness infects the well-established constitutional 
distinction between partial and total takings, where the 
analysis often starts and ends with the question of whether the 
regulation in question has gone “too far” to be done under the 
police power.12 The proper approach to compensability does not 
depend on these elusive notions of degree. Instead it should 
follow the lead of the private law of conveyances, especially as 
it is embodied in the law governing mineral support rights. 
Whenever government action shifts private rights from one 
party to another, a taking has occurred. All questions of degree 
are reserved for determining the proper level of compensation. 
In dealing with the regulatory issues of this conference, 
these insights are lost in the push for ever more government 
regulation in the land use area, all without compensation to 
those property owners whose use rights are either restricted or 
eliminated. More specifically, I am deeply troubled by the use 
of the words “Post-Zoning” in the conference title. New York 
City is on any account a place where public administrators 
exercise huge discretion over what parties should be allowed to 
develop what property on what terms. Yet the use of this 
conference title moves us in exactly the wrong direction by 
  
 10 See infra Part I.B. 
 11 See infra pp. 600-07.  
 12 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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making it appear that the major defect in the current system of 
land use regulation is that zoning law has proved inadequate to 
grapple with all the complex issues of land use, so that additional 
systems are needed in order to pick up the slack. My worst fears 
are richly confirmed simply by looking at one slide from the 
presentation of New York City Council Member Brad Lander, 
from the 39th District, which neatly links a set of overambitious 
goals with an expanded set of zoning and nonzoning tools 
designed to implement them. Thus, the slide reads as follows: 
 
It is hard to imagine a more relentlessly self-destructive 
agenda for New York City. The first of its many ills is the effort 
to link massive forms of labor regulation to real estate 
development. These labor regulations all are intended to raise 
wages above competitive levels for the benefit of the union 
workers who are behind the program, resulting, for example, in 
upending the Kingsbridge Armory project in 2009.13 The real 
estate regulations—pay particular notice to “special permits”—
are a way to hold the developers hostage to the labor rules. The 
combined effect is lower efficiency in both sectors, and an 
  
 13 For the most recent effort to jumpstart the project, see Eyewitness News, 
City Reopens Proposals for Kingsbridge Armory Site, WABC-TV/DT (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local/new_york&id=8521255. The site 
was abandoned in 1996 and is still undeveloped.  
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enormous boon to the political influence of public officials like 
Mr. Lander, who are able to insert themselves as of right into 
the middle of every land use decision that takes place within 
the city. One can recognize from the huge complexity in the 
patterns of land use in New York City, where land uses can 
vary within a single block, that zoning is often not the 
appropriate way to sort things out. But it hardly follows that 
another set of regulations should be brought into play to deal 
with zoning’s supposed shortfall. Zoning laws seek to deal with 
the conflicts that arise from the locational adjacencies that are 
commonplace in any dense urban environment, which they 
regulate only with indifferent success. In many cases the most 
difficult issues that a sound system of public regulation must 
deal with are such mundane issues as noise mitigation and 
traffic congestion, but these occupy at most a small fraction of 
attention on the Lander list.  
The avidity with which land use regulators champion 
multiple alternative land use controls should be understood as 
part of the long-standing governance problem facing local 
communities. Contrary to the hopes of planners, an increased 
level of government regulation is not part of any sustainable 
solution to land use issues. New kinds of regulatory schemes 
are often merely layered on top of existing regulations.14 The 
root of the difficulty here is that the current system of property 
rights in land is so weak that virtually all land use regulation 
issues are securely within the public domain. Rights to 
possession may remain secure, which is good as far as it goes. 
But it does not go far enough when state governments have 
veto rights over any plan for use or development of current 
land, which they can then tie to their collateral ambitions in 
“wage standards,” or indeed a host of other issues. The 
predictable outcome from this process is overall delay and 
systematic favoritism that allows one lucky or well-placed 
developer—it is never clear which—to receive the benefits not 
only of approvals but also of the blocking position against rival 
projects within the city. Ad hoc schemes of regulation are thus 
treacherous because the very freedom that allows the rare 
high-minded government official to put new schemes into place 
offers the freedom for battalions of ambitious government 
  
 14 For a discussion of these possibilities, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming 
Transect Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571 (2013) (describing novel zoning techniques that 
overlap with traditional Euclidian zoning on matters of aesthetics and performance). 
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officials to put misguided government regulations into place, 
piece by piece. 
In light of the manifest risks in the current 
constitutional and political order, the central question lies not 
in the details of any novel scheme. Rather, it lies in finding the 
types of systematic institutional constraint so desperately 
needed to channel the political discretion Council Member 
Lander and his cohorts have carved out for themselves into 
productive channels. On this point, the conventional wisdom 
plays into the hands of the status quo because it rests on the 
view that sound political judgment is needed to make the 
system go, and that such judgment is possible only in a legal 
regime that places sharp limitations on the reach of the 
Takings Clause to the federal and state constitutions.15 More 
specifically, the received wisdom today insists that while just 
compensation may be required whenever the government 
permanently occupies land, it ought never—except perhaps in 
extreme cases of “no economic viability”16—be required to 
compensate when it “merely” regulates land use, whether or 
not as part of some comprehensive zoning scheme.  
The argument in favor of the status quo—to the extent 
that anyone even bothers to address these questions today—is 
that the introduction of a compensation requirement will 
necessarily impede the implementation of systematic planning 
in the public good, which requires a high level of political 
control over the process. Any desirable protections that are 
afforded are thought to be procedural in nature, such that 
individual landowners have the right to present their views at 
  
 15 For an early statement of this position, see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 
33 (1954) (citations omitted): 
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not 
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is 
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized 
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of 
values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of 
Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as 
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 
 16 For a statement of this position, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted): “As we 
have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use 
regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land.” 
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public hearings and through other forms of political action.17 
Strong property entitlements thus give way to partial 
participation rights in the overall political process.  
All this is sadly misplaced. In my view, the ultimate 
question in land use regulation does not deal with the 
particulars of any given scheme of land use control. It deals 
with the question of whether we should draw a line between 
those areas that are subject to per se rights of compensation 
and those in which no compensation is owing at all, which, as I 
noted above, should be determined by clear rules and not ad 
hoc balancing tests. The first of these domains of permanent 
physical occupation is outlined in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp.,18 which follows a per se compensation 
rule. The second of regulatory takings is most closely 
associated in modern times with Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City,19 which relies on a mushy balancing test. 
The interim territory is addressed in the Court’s key decision in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,20 in which only 
those forms of regulation that leave the landowner with no 
viable economic use of the property are thought to require 
compensation by a modest extension of Loretto. The rest 
remains in political solution. 
To address these issues, I shall proceed as follows. In 
Part I, I shall stress the critical distinction between those 
issues that are relevant to the question of whether a taking has 
taken place and those issues that relate to the level of 
compensation owing once the taking is established. I argue that 
the only way to attack these issues is to track the private-law 
rules, as noted earlier, that govern the distinction between 
liability and damages. I then argue that hard-edged rules are 
needed for deciding liability in private law and for deciding the 
taking question in public law. In Part II, I show how this 
framework plays out with the dubious constitutional distinction 
between permanent and temporary takings. In Part III, I apply 
that same framework to the distinction between physical and 
regulatory takings. In Part IV, I show how this analysis helps 
discern the proper rule of transferable development rights in 
takings law. A brief conclusion follows. 
  
 17 See, e.g., Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172 (1985). 
 18 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 19 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 20 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
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I. TAKINGS AND VALUATION: A FRESH START 
A. Private Analogies for Public Situations  
The current state of the law of takings requires a 
thorough reexamination of the relationship between occupation, 
regulation, and compensation, which today give the state far too 
much running room in dealing with the wide range of 
condemnation and regulation cases in the land use area. This 
problem is likely to prove especially acute in major cities like 
New York. The root of the difficulty lies not in the particulars 
but in matters of basic structure. To see why this is the case, it is 
best to step back from the particular institutional arrangements 
and ask about how best to design any system of regulation.  
In this regard, it is often a mistake to start with public 
systems, because it is all too easy to become entranced with the 
proposition that the state should be endowed with special 
rights that transcend those of its particular citizens. After all, 
if all property comes top down from the state, it is easy, even 
after the fact, to announce that a particular grant was subject 
to conditions—express or implied—that constrain its proper 
use. It is also too easy to fall into the comfortable complacency 
of Justice John Paul Stevens in Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, when he wrote:  
Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held 
under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be 
injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause did not 
transform that principle to one that requires compensation 
whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.21 
From this mistaken premise, it takes little imagination 
for local opposition to real estate development to conjure up 
harm that is “injurious to the community” so that the takings 
law is dramatically severed from the law of nuisance. The 
adoption of this broad definition of harm thus makes it 
inevitable that some harm will occur no matter what is done, so 
that it always lies within the political domain to decide which 
harms should be controlled and which disallowed. This 
inclusive account of the harm principle in turn creates a broad 
and capacious view of the police power that necessarily shunts 
off to one side any claims for private property rights. As that 
  
 21 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
598 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
deus ex machina is not available in private disputes, all 
entitlements claims are more subject to scrutiny. A better 
approach is surely needed, and that, in turn, depends on the 
effective utilization of bright-line rules that already organize so 
many voluntary arrangements. 
B. Bright-Line Rules  
In the private law, the major objective is to minimize 
the level of frictions between neighbors in order to allow 
productive activities to go forward with minimum fuss and 
bother. Clear boundary lines give individuals unique authority 
to decide how to use given resources. This reduces the level of 
transactional confusion and uncertainty that comes when 
government officials are given a huge reservoir of power to 
insist that certain activities are in violation of some implied, 
but utterly unspecified, account of the police power. 
The current jumble of takings law fails to articulate the 
bright-line rules that are needed to decide whether 
compensation is owing and if so, what level is required. In 
organizing the law of takings, it is critical to remember that 
every legal system must make a choice between two types of 
rules.22 One option is a bright-line rule that is reminiscent of a 
foul line in baseball or a boundary line in football. Decisions 
are made by looking at outputs, not inputs. Balls that are hit 
foul are not in play. Those that are hit fair are within play. The 
entire system is dichotomous, so much so that detailed 
determinations must be made as to whether the entire foot or 
ball has to be in bounds, or whether it is sufficient that there is 
some overlap, however small, between the foot or ball and the 
line. These systems are pervasive in every sport. To be sure, 
there are modest tweaks to make the system work better: the 
player who is pushed out of bounds can be treated as if he 
landed in bounds, and so on. And there is usually a second tier 
of sanctions for bean balls and flagrant fouls that can impose 
something akin to criminal sanctions: fines, suspensions, 
rehab, and the like. But never let the exceptions divert 
attention from the main feature of the system, which involves 
  
 22 I pursue this theme in Richard A. Epstein, The Irrelevance of the Hand 
Formula: How Institutional Arrangements Structure Tort Liability, in LIBER 
AMICORUM BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT 65-76 (Jef De Mot ed., Brugge, Die Keure 2012) 
(Festschrift in honor of Boudewijn Bouckaert). 
2013] PROTECTION OF PARTIAL INTERESTS IN LAND 599 
bright-line rules with clear outcomes that are measurable 
independent of the efforts of the participants. 
The same utilization of bright-line rules should be 
dominant in organizing systems of legal liability. Under a 
negligence system, these disputes are all too often decided by a 
detailed examination of the defendant’s conduct leading up to 
the occurrence of harm. That long inquiry need not be 
undertaken under a thoroughgoing system of strict liability. 
Boundary rules, such as those involved in any sound code of 
traffic rules, should determine in principle how the system 
applies. If neither party deviates from the rules, no accident 
occurs. If one party deviates, and the other does not, that party 
bears the full liability. If both deviate, they share the 
responsibility. This system, which is commonly used in 
practice, has much more clarity than the standard formulas of 
negligence that invite a generalized balancing regime 
commonly associated with the Hand formula.23 Under this 
approach, many formal tests of liability unwisely stress that a 
party may be found liable for negligence only if care levels fall 
below some socially determined figure. In practice, the rules of 
negligence per se, tied closely to compliance with the traffic 
rules, often negate those kinds of inquiries.  
On matters of public administration, the key point here 
concerns theory, not practice. And in practice, where huge 
numbers of claims must be processed with great rapidity, the 
detailed inquiry into negligence never takes place at all, 
because it is just too expensive.24 Quite simply, a liability rule is 
an on–off switch. A bright-line rule is also an on–off switch. The 
two match well with each other. A clear set of factual 
determinants eases the burden on decision makers ex post. Care 
levels are not directly monitored, but the output-based rules 
exert powerful incentives on private parties to conform their 
conduct to law. Indeed, as a first approximation, the defendant 
who knows he will face liability will organize conduct so that he 
takes all cost-effective precautions, just as the Hand formula 
requires.25 The result is appropriate levels of care, without 
having to incur the cost of monitoring. No one doubts that in 
some cases, matters of solvency and the like could dictate some 
  
 23 The Hand formula compares the expected costs of accidents against the burden 
of precaution. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 24 See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 98-99 (2d ed. 1980). 
 25 See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
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form of ex ante relief by way of injunction. But even so, 
whenever a liability system is needed, the output measures will 
work best so long as we can set the rules of the road. 
Once liability is determined, the question of 
compensation for losses remains. There are endless variations 
on how proper compensation should be computed, but for these 
purposes, there is only one point that matters. Any sensible 
rule on compensation requires that the trier of fact use a 
continuous distribution on the valuation so that the 
compensation provided can be proportionate to the loss 
inflicted. That distribution is required whether we think in 
terms of fairness or efficiency—or some combination of the two. 
And this proposition remains true even if it is universally 
agreed that certain types of losses can only be translated into 
dollars and cents with great difficulty, if at all. The point here 
is that the only two choices we have are fixed damage amounts 
or variable compensation. Owing to the pervasive and 
inevitable variation in the extent of these wrongs, the variable 
measure dominates every time. It does so, moreover, regardless 
of the rule that is used to determine liability in the first place. 
In essence, the correct sequence is liability by rule, damages by 
degree. Simple to state, if hard to carry out. 
The same set of insights carries over to decisions by 
government to condemn land or regulate land use. The 
boundary lines that play such a key role in dealing with 
sporting events and automobile accidents should have the same 
role in land use cases. The decision on whether compensation is 
owing is an on–off question, which in the first instance should 
be subject to a bright-line rule. The question of damages 
awarded for the property taken should vary, as a first 
approximation, with the value of the property taken. Even if 
other elements such as consequential damages are added back 
into the mix, they too should be determined continuously.  
Unfortunately, the current set of constitutional norms 
only follows the second half of this dual strategy, as set out 
under the Loretto test. The cases of permanent physical 
occupation are said to require compensation on a per se rule, 
leaving the amount owing to the extent of the loss. But under the 
Penn Central rule, all other partial takings of land are treated as 
mere regulatory takings, which are manifestly subject to rather 
different rules. The uncertainty here comes on two dimensions, 
both of which require some discussion. The first is the line 
between a permanent and a temporary taking. The second is the 
line between occupation and regulation. Both distinctions quickly 
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become terms of art, and both require some comment before 
turning to specific land use systems of regulation.  
II. PERMANENT VERSUS TEMPORARY TAKINGS  
The line between permanent and temporary takings has 
its origins in Justice Holmes’s eloquent but misguided decision 
in Block v. Hirsh, which sustained a “temporary” two-year 
ordinance designed to keep rents under control in the 
aftermath of World War I.26 Holmes stated the case succinctly: 
[T]he [statutory] provisions . . . are made necessary by emergencies 
growing out of the war, resulting in rental conditions in the District 
dangerous to the public health and burdensome to public officers, 
employees and accessories, and thereby embarrassing the Federal 
Government in the transaction of the public business. As emergency 
legislation the Title is to end in two years unless sooner repealed.27 
In dealing with the challenge, Justice Holmes did not 
make any reference to the distinction between physical and 
regulatory takings, which then lay far in the future. Nor did he 
deny that the holdover tenant had taken the property from the 
landlord.28 Instead, he made two arguments. The first was an 
implicit police power justification, namely, that the chaotic 
conditions after the war required this regulatory intervention.29 
Justice Holmes never asked the question whether it would 
have been better to offer housing allowances to government 
employees instead of entrenching all tenants in their property 
for two years, regardless of their personal situations. 
Somewhat unconvinced by his own rationale, he then added 
this Holmesian flourish: “The regulation is put and justified 
only as a temporary measure. A limit in time, to tide over a 
passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld 
as a permanent change.”30 
No explanation, and no sense. The question in this case 
was whether a decision to order a holdover tenant into the 
premises has to be regarded as a taking for a term. The entire 
law of property understands how critical it is to specify 
ownership rights in land not only by metes and bounds but also 
by time. The use of that second dimension makes possible 
  
 26 Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921). 
 27 Id. at 154. 
 28 Id. at 153-54. 
 29 Id. at 154-56. 
 30 Id. at 157 (citation omitted). 
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extensive gains from trade through the division of property 
interests. The clear temporal division makes it clear who is 
entitled to possession of the premises at any given time. More 
complex arrangements, such as shared premises and leases, 
can be negotiated by contract. The correct public-law approach 
is to track the private-law distinctions.  
The categorical distinction between permanent and 
temporary takings so prized by Holmes suffers from two fatal 
defects. The first is that it is not possible to identify which 
cases fall on which side the line. Property is always projected 
on the plane of time, so that interests can run from a short-
term lease to the fee simple absolute, which has no definite 
termination date. All of these are property interests, defined by 
time as well as space. Under the private law, all are protected 
equally. When the system of state regulation seeks to upset that 
continuous understanding, it faces the very set of problems that 
the private law has been able to overcome. On questions of 
degree, the fundamental inquiry is this: why should some 
(undefined) class require full compensation for a loss, while 
another class, which lies a hair’s breath away on the other side 
of the line, requires none. No one can explain why that 
permanent–temporary line should be drawn at a day, year, 
decade, or century. Yet, under Holmes’s formulation, 
compensation, as measured by the difference between contract 
and market, must be furnished by the state in permanent but 
not temporary cases. Surely, permanent cannot cover only cases 
that last forever, but has to cover occupation for 100 years, or 
even for periods that equal or exceed the useful life of the 
structure. So, already, permanent means “not quite permanent.” 
The second flaw is that this supposed distinction lacks 
the hard-edged character needed for on–off determinations. In 
reality, that hard-edged line is supplied the moment the tenant 
overstays the lease. At that point, the longer the tenant stays 
in possession, the greater the compensation owing. Nowhere 
does Holmes offer any coherent rationale based on notions of 
fairness or efficiency to explain why a clear line should be 
abandoned in favor of a distinction that turns cases into matters 
of degree. The difference by length is, however, perfectly covered 
by continuous modification of the compensation levels to reflect 
precisely the duration of deprivation. It may well be that some 
consequential damages should be given to the landlord as well, 
but those too should depend on the nature of the dislocation, 
without any distinction between permanent and temporary. The 
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distinction violates the fundamental structural requirements of 
a good system of compensation for physical takings. 
The differences in approach matter. One simple 
illustration is the current system of rent stabilization in New 
York City, which in its current form has been in place now 
continuously since 1969.31 But that notational three-year term 
is a victory of appearance over reality. The defenders of rent 
control were well familiar with Holmes’s decision, so that they 
have studiously avoided any permanent rent control that could 
run afoul of his dictum. Instead, from the outset, the current 
practice in New York City has called for a succession of three-
year temporary programs—each tied in ritual fashion to the 
Holmesian emergency.32 The system requires the City Council 
and the Mayor to certify in a pro forma fashion that the 
shortage, defined as a vacancy rate below 5 percent, still 
continues.33 “In order to extend the Rent Stabilization Law, the 
City must determine that a housing emergency exists to merit 
the need for rent stabilization,” said Mayor Bloomberg.34 The 
vacancy rate is now 3.12 percent.35 Done. It matters not that 
the low-cost rentals (plus countless other restrictions) are the 
cause of the shortage.  
The object lesson of the ritual reenactment is to show 
that it is easy beyond words to game the short-versus-long 
timeline that Holmes proposed in Block v. Hirsh. In contrast, it 
is not possible to game any system in which the duration of the 
taking moves in lockstep with the amount of the compensation 
owing. Yet none of these considerations work themselves into a 
system known for the below-market rates it gives to some 
tenants, thereby forcing others in nonstabilized units to bear 
the full brunt of new arrivals to the New York rental market. 
The wrong constitutional frame has generated the wrong 
political response, with the wrong social outcomes. The key 
  
 31 N.Y.C. Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-
501 to -520 (1969), available at http://tenant.net/Rent_Laws/RSL/rsltoc.html (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2012).  
 32 See N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines Bd., Rent Act of 2011, HOUSINGNYC, 
http://www.housingnyc.com/html/resources/rent2011.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2012). 
 33 Bloomberg Extends Rent Control for Three More Years, REAL DEAL (Mar. 
27, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://therealdeal.com/blog/2012/03/27/bloomberg-extends-rent-
control-for-three-more-years/. 
 34 Kim Velsey, Rental Relief! Mayor Bloomberg Renews NYC Rent Regulation 
Law, N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://observer.com/2012/03/rental-
relief-mayor-bloomberg-renews-nyc-rent-regulation-law/.  
 35 Press Release, NYC.gov, Mayor Bloomberg Releases Findings of 2011 New 
York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (Feb. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2012a/pr050-12.html. 
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point in all these cases is that, as a matter of first principle, the 
duration of the regulation only determines the amount of 
compensation for the government regulation, but not the fact of 
a taking itself. The use of the correct definition eliminates New 
York City’s ability to evade the just compensation requirement 
through its system of successive regulations that are the 
functional equivalent of a system of long-term regulation.  
The shaky line between continuous and permanent 
occupation also arises in flooding cases. On this score, the 
received wisdom deviates from sound principles by insisting on 
a strong line between a tort and a taking. The distinction has 
been articulated in unmistakable terms in the Supreme Court 
case law. In Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States,36 a 
unanimous Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, 
held that damage to plaintiff’s bridge by the government’s 
blasting operations counted as a noncompensable tort and not 
as taking of the private property. Then, in Sanguinetti v. 
United States, Justice Sutherland wrote: “[I]n order to create 
an enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least, 
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the 
structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the 
land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an 
injury to the property.”37 Justice Frankfurter pursued the same 
theme in United States v. Dickinson, when he wrote: “Property 
is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made 
upon an owner’s use of it to an extent that, as between private 
parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or 
in course of time.”38 These pronouncements are misguided for 
two separate reasons.39  
First, they make the level of compensation turn on the 
length of the causal chain. Harms that are “direct” are covered, 
while those which are indirect are not. That distinction is at 
variance with the normal private-law treatment of the same 
subject, where the only question for liability is not whether the 
harm was directly or indirectly caused, but whether the harm 
in question was too remote to be attributable to the defendant’s 
act. Under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, which cemented the 
role of strict liability in nineteenth-century England, it is 
immaterial whether the defendants poured or sent water down 
  
 36 260 U.S. 125, 127 (1922). 
 37 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924).  
 38 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). 
 39 For my earlier critique, see EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 44-46. 
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the mine of the plaintiff,40 or whether it came to rest in the 
reservoir before it broke through its foundation. Under the 
famous formulation of Judge Blackburn, it was enough that 
“the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and 
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his own peril . . . .”41 Similarly, in 
Spano v. Perini Corp., yet another blasting case, the Court held 
that it was immaterial whether “there was ‘a physical invasion’ 
of, or trespass on, the plaintiff’s property . . . [or whether] the 
damage was caused by ‘setting the air in motion, or in some 
other unexplained way.’”42 The question is whether the 
defendant could be said to have caused the harm. The length of 
the causal chain did not influence any finding of liability, even 
though in earlier times it may have influenced the choice of 
remedy between trespass and trespass on the case.43 The 
question thus remains why a distinction that is regarded as 
immaterial to liability under the tort law should assume 
decisive importance when the question turns to compensation 
under the Takings Clause. 
Second, as a matter of tort theory, it is utterly 
immaterial to the plaintiff’s case for compensation that the 
defendant did not acquire some sort of servitude over his 
property. The question under tort is always what level of harm 
was caused, not what return benefit the plaintiff received. To be 
sure, in some cases, where a trespass caused trivial harm to the 
plaintiff but supplied great benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff 
could elect to waive the tort remedy and sue instead for 
restitution.44 That restitution is clearly blocked by the Takings 
Clause, whose major function is to make sure that the landowner 
cannot hold out against a government project. The compromise 
solution is that the government program can go forward but only 
if the landowner receives compensation for his losses.  
  
 40 Fletcher v. Rylands, [1865] 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (L.R. Exch.). Per Bramwell, B., 
“The defendants had no right to pour or send water onto the plaintiff’s works.” Id. at 743. 
 41 Fletcher, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279, aff’d sub nom, [1868] Rylands v. 
Fletcher 3 L.R.E. & I. App. (H.L) 330.  
 42 Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 34 (N.Y. 1969) (quoting Booth v. 
Rome, 35 N.E. 592, 596 (N.Y. 1893)).  
 43 For discussion of the importance of the forms of action, see OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77-84 (1881). 
 44 See Phillips v. Homfray, [1883] 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883). For discussion, see 
Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1400 
n.73 (1994). 
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The rickety structure of the current law is illustrated by 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States45—another 
flooding case that has just been decided by the Supreme 
Court.46 At issue in that case was whether the United States 
owed compensation for the sporadic release of water from 
behind a dam that the Army Corps of Engineers constructed in 
southeast Missouri. The deliberate release of water from 
behind the dam flooded 23,000 acres of timberland that the 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission owned some 115 miles 
south of the dam. Between 1993 and 2000, water from behind 
the dam was, from time to time, released in order to control the 
rate of flow from the Black River. It was agreed on all hands 
that a permanent occupation of the lands by flood water would 
be a compensable event. Not so, for temporary releases. The 
question then was how to treat these periodic and unscheduled 
releases, which, without question, destroyed trees owned by the 
Arkansas Commission when the water from the flood 
undermined the root systems of the trees before it receded. It 
was clear that the Corps’ operation of the dam necessarily had 
to cause some releases, but there was a disagreement as to the 
foreseeability of the type and extent of damages. 
The case received an exhaustive treatment in the 
Federal Circuit, where Judge Dyk reviewed the relevant 
precedents, which he summarized as follows:  
As with structural cases, in determining whether a governmental 
decision to release water from a dam can result in a taking, we must 
distinguish between action which is by its nature temporary and that 
which is permanent. But in distinguishing between temporary and 
permanent action, we do not focus on a structure and its consequence. 
Rather we must focus on whether the government flood control policy 
was a permanent or temporary policy. Releases that are ad hoc or 
temporary cannot, by their very nature, be inevitably recurring.47 
Stated otherwise, we are told that the relevant line is 
that a government action “must ‘constitute an actual, 
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation 
of and not merely an injury to the property.’”48 The dissent of 
  
 45 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
 46 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 511.  
 47 637 F.3d at 1377. The relevant precedents, accurately summarized, include 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 328 (1987), Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924), and 
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).  
 48 Sanguinetti, 246 U.S. at 149. 
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Judge Newman did not disagree on the overall approach, but 
drew the line between a permanent and temporary taking in a 
different place. Precedent, according to Judge Newman, well 
establishes that when property “is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water . . . so as to effectively destroy 
or impair its usefulness, it is a taking[] within the meaning of 
the Constitution . . . .”49 “Precedent does not require constant or 
permanent flooding, and eventual abatement of the flooding 
does not defeat entitlement to just compensation; the specific 
facts must be considered, as for any invasion of property.”50  
Neither of these ad hoc views held when the case 
reached the Supreme Court. The Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission had a victory of sorts in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which unanimously ordered the case remanded for further 
consideration. Ironically, the issue of sovereign immunity, which 
loomed so large in the decisions below was nowhere addressed 
by the Court, where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg framed the 
question to ask “whether a taking may occur, within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause, when government-induced flood 
invasions, although repetitive, are temporary.”51 Yet once again 
the question illustrates the ragged nature of the permanent–
temporary distinction, and necessarily raises the question of how 
repetitive and severe these flood invasions must be to cross over 
the line between noncompensable and compensable events. No 
matter where that line is drawn, the risk remains that the 
differences in outcome will depend not only on the total amount 
of flood damage that takes place, but on small differences in 
the frequency and intensity of the individual events that 
compose the whole. Yet at no point did the fine points of the 
distribution of floods alter the bottom line that before the floods 
began the forest lands were “healthy and flourishing,” while 
afterwards they were not.52 
At this point, the opinion becomes murky at best. 
Justice Ginsburg begins by quoting the most familiar line from 
Armstrong v. United States, to the effect that “The Takings 
Clause is ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”53 In that case 
  
 49 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872). 
 50 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1381. 
 51 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 515. 
 52 Id. at 517. 
 53 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960): The full passage reads: 
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the Supreme Court held that a materialman’s lien on a naval 
vessel could not be dissolved by the unilateral action of the 
United States unless it paid just compensation.  
But in the next breadth she notes that notwithstanding 
this general proposition, “most takings claims turn on 
situation-specific factual inquiries.”54 At this point, the question 
of compensability becomes hopelessly ad hoc, as all the subtle 
differences in degree that should be relevant to the question of 
compensation owed are now thrown into the hopper to 
determine whether any compensation is owed at all. The 
Supreme Court again plunges into conceptual darkness by 
failing to understand that bright-line rules are needed to 
determine whether any compensation is owing. Only then are 
continuous rules needed to determine the amount of 
compensation required. So after an inconclusive examination of 
its past decisions, the Court refuses to accept the government’s 
slippery slope argument to relieve it of all liability regardless of 
the severity of the flooding in question. So it is back to the 
laundry list of factors, at which point a remand is now 
required: 
When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government 
interferes with private property, our decisions recognize, time is 
indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a 
compensable taking. . . . 
Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the 
invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized 
government action. . . . So, too, are the character of the land at issue 
and the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations” 
regarding the land’s use. . . . Severity of the interference figures in 
the calculus as well.55  
Treated, therefore, as a matter of private law, the 
precedents cited earlier demonstrate that compensation applies 
in both permanent and temporary takings, so that on the 
question of liability, the variations in question are of no 
consequence. Ex post, it is possible to both identify the harms 
  
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for 
a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this 
constitutional protection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here. 
 54 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518 (citing Penn Central Transp. 
Co., v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), discussed infra at Part IV). 
 55 Id. at 522 (citations omitted). 
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caused by the flooding and the measure of damages involved. 
Armed with that information, there is no need to ask about the 
frequency and distribution of the harms in question to decide 
whether compensation is owing. All physical harms are 
compensable. The battle is solely over amount. 
Once this unified approach is taken, it is no longer 
necessary to distinguish between cases where the government 
is protected from mere tort claims and those where it must pay 
full compensation for the permanent occupation of land. It is 
therefore no longer necessary to ask when government action 
crosses some indefinite line that morphs a noncompensable tort 
into a full-blooded, compensable taking. Both cases involve 
physical invasions. Everything else on timing and detail is only 
relevant to the valuation question. In addition, the added 
intellectual clarity from a clean rule helps organize judicial 
behavior and send the correct incentives to administrative 
bodies. Returning to the flooding precedents, the conceptual 
problem is this: it is always possible to imagine distinct release 
schedules that over any defined period of time cause exactly 
the same amount of downstream damage as a single release. 
Do we want to say that a few large releases should be subject to 
a compensation requirement when the periodic smaller 
releases that cause identical harm are not? What do we do with 
releases in three equal installments? This is no different from 
saying that the government must compensate the individual 
from whom it seizes $1000 in a lump sum, but need not pay 
any compensation when it takes an irregular set of future 
payments whose present value equals $1000.  
The issue here is not whether we can guess about which 
cases to put on which side of the line, but why it is that we 
need to draw the line at all. This is not a case where there is 
some “average reciprocity of advantage” to both sides, which 
tucks nicely into Holmes’s famous aphorism.56 Unfortunately, in 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the downstream releases 
all go necessarily in one direction, which means that the 
United States always wins and Arkansas always loses.57 There 
  
 56 For the initial use of the phrase, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415 (1922), speaking of what “secured an average reciprocity of advantage 
that has been recognized as a justification of various laws.” For extensive discussion of 
the case, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
POLITICS 13-61 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic 
Takings Jurisprudence of Justice Holmes, 86 GEO. L.J. 875 (1998). 
 57 For discussion of this asymmetry, see Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, 
State of Nature Theory, and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. L. & LIBERTY 1 (2008). 
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is no question that these releases would be actionable at 
common law,58 and there is no reason why any court should 
attempt to divide them into different classes to resolve a 
dispute that need not arise. The bifurcation of the analysis into 
takings and damages eliminates, in the ex post world, a set of 
arbitrary distinctions that no jurisprudence can make clear. 
Eliminating this distinction puts on the government the full 
costs of its actions, so that it no longer has any incentive to 
game the system by using a set of temporary releases that 
artfully stay on the noncompensation side of the line. It is only 
a small irony that the coercion for environmental protection 
that drives government programs into overdrive against 
private defendants, often at the cost of serious due process 
violations,59 is blithely ignored by unprincipled efforts to 
artificially narrow the class of compensable events. This double 
standard makes hash out of the law of partial takings.  
There is no coherent reason to have the on–off switch of 
compensation turn on the frequency, severity, and distribution 
of the harm. These are questions of degree that should, under 
no circumstances, be raised to ostensible differences in kind. 
The purpose of strict liability in tort is to control the 
externalities created when activity on one land causes harm on 
another. Armed with the information in the ex post state of the 
world, there is no reason to figure out the knowledge possessed 
by government agents at the outset when they devised their 
flood control plan. Instead, government officials are held 
responsible for what they do, like other actors. Rather than 
face up to the implications of the broad scope of the 
constitutional protection that is offered under the Takings 
Clause, the Justices of the Supreme Court to date have 
preferred to announce and defend untenable distinctions with 
perfect confidence. The result is predictable chaos. But here as 
elsewhere, there is no way to get the right result by tweaking 
the wrong premises. 
III. TAKINGS VERSUS REGULATION 
The permanent–temporary line is a dead loser in 
takings law. So too is the ostensibly related constitutional 
distinction between takings and regulation. The origin of this 
distinction lies in Holmes’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
  
 58 See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.). 
 59 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-73 (2012). 
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Mahon,60 which is an infuriating mix between great intellectual 
insight and unpardonable legal gibberish. The case involved 
the question of whether the local government could condemn 
out a support easement that Pennsylvania Coal had explicitly 
reserved for itself when it conveyed the surface interest to 
Mahon (and to others similarly situated) in 1878. The retention 
of the support easement meant, in effect, that the coal company 
had the right to dig out coal from under the surface without 
worrying whether the land or any buildings on it would cave in. 
The legislative decision at issue essentially transferred the 
easement in question back to the owner. The clear 
conveyancing rule that governs this particular case is that once 
the two parties have agreed to one division of common 
property, any decision by the state to alter that division of 
rights constitutes a taking of an interest vested in one and 
transferring it to the other. The key point here is that to 
answer the takings question there is no need to ask whether 
the state transfer of the support easement was a total transfer 
of a partial interest or a partial transfer of a larger interest. 
Either way it is a taking. All the fine points go only to 
valuation on the extent of the loss to the coal company, not to 
the government’s liability. 
Justice Holmes got this case half right. His most apt 
comparison is found in this proposition: 
If in any case its representatives have been so short sighted as to 
acquire only surface rights without the right of support, we see no 
more authority for supplying the latter without compensation than 
there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing 
to pay for it because the public wanted it very much.61  
But in other places he strays off the mark by misstating 
how the police power interacts with the Takings Clause. 
Mahon is not like the ordinary situation where the government 
enjoins a private nuisance, at which point it owes no more 
compensation to the landowner than would be required of 
private plaintiffs who succeeded on the same theory. But in 
this setting the protection of safety for the surface owner 
involves the destruction of private interest previously 
conveyed. Compensation is thus owed here just as it would be 
owed if the state took timber from the land of a third party to 
shore up the mining operations of Pennsylvania Coal.  
  
 60 260 U.S. at 412-16. 
 61 Id. at 415. 
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Justice Holmes, however, had long had a strong 
tendency to argue that matters of degree often should be 
treated as though they create differences in kind—in violation 
of our fundamental structural constraint. Thus, in Leroy Fibre 
Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway62 the question 
was whether there was contributory negligence in a plaintiff 
that stored its flax too close to the railroad tracks. The majority 
decision of Justice McKenna treated this as a question of 
property rights and held the distance irrelevant. There was no 
duty to remove the flax from the tracks. Holmes, however, 
thought that the owners should have done so, tested by the 
question of “whether the plaintiff’s flax was so near to the track 
as to be in danger from even a prudently managed engine.”63 
Thereafter, Holmes waxes eloquent:  
I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my 
view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as 
soon as it is civilized. Negligence is all degree[]—that of the 
defendant here degree of the nicest sort; and between the variations 
according to distance that I suppose to exist and the simple 
universality of the rules in the Twelve Tables or the Leges 
Barbarorum, there lies the culture of two thousand years.64 
In modern terms, Holmes may well have been right to 
think that in these cases some “joint care” solution might make 
sense. It could well be that some fire suppression steps by the 
railroad should be coupled with some loss protection by the 
landowner. But if so, the nature of that dual accommodation 
remains unclear. Distance is a very weak proxy, and a more 
elaborate set of accommodations by legislation might prove 
sensible.  
Just that statutory solution was adopted in the simpler 
situation involving the tension between rights of privacy and 
the construction of spite fences in Holmes’s 1889 decision in 
Rideout v. Knox.65 There, Holmes resorted to a similar 
distinction of degree to uphold against challenge a statute that 
allowed for a finding of a spite fence, but only for fences over 
six feet high.66 He noted, first, that at common law, normally 
owners can build their fences as high as they choose, so that 
  
 62 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 340-41 (1914). 
 63 Id. at 353 (Holmes, J., partially concurring). 
 64 Id. at 354 (internal citations omitted). 
 65 Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 391 (Mass. 1889). 
 66 Id. at 392. 
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the laws here impose a clear limitation on that established 
property right. He then continued: 
But it does not follow that the rule is the same for a boundary fence, 
unnecessarily built more than six feet high. It may be said that the 
difference is only one of degree. Most differences are, when nicely 
analyzed. At any rate, difference of degree is one of the distinctions 
by which the right of the legislature to exercise the police power is 
determined. Some small limitations of previously existing rights 
incident to property may be imposed for the sake of preventing a 
manifest evil; larger ones could not be, except by the exercise of the 
right of eminent domain.67 
The reason this solution works for this case is not 
because of the fuzzy way in which Holmes tries to articulate 
the distinction between the police power and the eminent 
domain power. Rather, it is because the statute preserves a 
safe harbor for fences up to eye-level, where the risk to privacy 
from nearby pedestrians is greatest. The extra requirement of 
malice works well here because the average reciprocity of 
advantage does suggest that both sides are better off from this 
restriction of the normal right to increase the height of fences. 
The issue, therefore, is not just a simple question of degree, as 
Holmes thinks. Viewed as a whole, the statute could easily 
work a Pareto improvement between neighbors: this well-
constructed legal regime makes it highly likely that the 
average reciprocity of advantage satisfies the just 
compensation requirement. Yet that reciprocity condition is 
manifestly violated in Pennsylvania Coal, where Holmes sticks 
with his (now misplaced) distinction of degree. He jumps 
headlong into the fire when he writes the one sentence that, 
above all others, has set modern takings law off on the wrong 
track: “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking.”68 At 
this point, the trap door springs shut, as the line between 
  
 67 Id. 
 68 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Holmes then talks about 
the public necessity cases without analyzing them. In fact, they require some kind of a 
split verdict. In those cases where the property of A, which would not be harmed by the 
fire, is used to prevent its spread, compensation should be owing. But in those cases 
where the state destroys property that would otherwise be destroyed by the 
conflagration, then no compensation is required, except for the trivial loss of the use 
value for the time between the earlier destruction and its final destruction, which can 
be ignored. See Mayor of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend. 126, 129-30 (N.Y. 1837). For 
further discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES & 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 51-52 (10th ed. 2012). Once again Holmes’s uncertain grasp of 
private law leads to an unnecessary level of indecision in dealing with the 
constitutional issues. 
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takings and valuation disappears. The question of 
compensability now morphs into one of degree, and in 
Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes argues that the regulation has 
crossed the line because, “[t]o make it commercially 
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same 
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or 
destroying it.”69  
Once again, the equivocation, “very nearly the same 
effect,” gives rise to the question of whether it does or it 
doesn’t. The correct answer in this case does not turn on the 
futile distinction between physical and regulatory takings. 
Correctly understood, the loss of the support easement ends the 
takings inquiry, and the proper measure of damage depends on 
the effects of the regulation on the operation of the mine. It 
makes no difference on this ground whether the taking in 
question is “physical”—insofar as it is not possible to take out 
columns of coal needed to support the surface—or “regulatory” 
because the coal can be removed so long as the mining company 
complies with requirements to put in place substitute measures 
to support the surface. Holmes’s intellectual shipwreck repeats 
an oft-made error in takings law by having questions of degree 
masquerade as distinctions in kind. 
IV. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AS “JUST 
COMPENSATION” 
This self-conscious muddle between the takings issue 
and the compensation issue is well-illustrated by taking a look 
at one of the “post-zoning devices” discussed at this 
conference—transferable development rights (TDRs). The idea 
behind TDRs is to use the development rights that are granted 
in one location (“the receiving site”) as compensation for the 
development rights that are lost in another (“the sending 
site”).70 The reason for making that shift is to preserve a sense 
of open spaces in some sensitive areas, while directing 
development to those areas where it will cause, on balance, the 
fewest environmental dislocations. TDRs are discussed at 
length in my colleague Professor Vicki Been’s instructive paper 
on modern efforts to increase their utilization by matching new 
  
 69 Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414-15. 
 70 See NOELLE HIGGINS, WHAT ARE TDRS?, available at 
http://depts.washington.edu/open2100/pdf/3_OpenSpaceImplement/Implementation_ 
Mechanisms/transfer_development_rights.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
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projects with empty spaces.71 Her inquiry asks how best to 
fashion market devices to secure the transfer of these rights 
between parties. She notes, correctly, that two obstacles stand 
in the path of their rapid transfer. The first of these is 
unavoidable. These rights are hard to value, so that the costs 
involved in their transfer are high relative to the potential 
gains, even in a voluntary market, including the heavy cost of 
securing support rights from the surface owner in 
Pennsylvania Coal. Second, matters are made more complex by 
the wide range of government restrictions that limit the sale of 
TDRs, which include the need for the transferee of the TDR to 
secure a distinct zoning clearance for new construction, a long 
and tortuous process. As Professor Been notes, it is hard to 
make this a robust market. 
The antecedent question is why in a system with strong 
property rights there ever arises the need to transfer the TDRs 
in the first place, given that the owner of the “receiving site” 
would already hold the rights to development on his own land. 
In this regard, it is important to see how the Penn Central case 
uses TDRs to grease the way to an intolerable account of the 
regulatory takings test, which is its enduring legacy. Recall 
that in Penn Central, the question that faced the Supreme 
Court was whether the designation of Grand Central Terminal 
as a landmark site meant that the city could stop the 
construction of the Breuer Tower without compensation, so 
long as the surface owner could cover its costs, and then some, 
by the revenue obtained from its use of the existing structures 
on the land. Even though Grand Central station was not a 
public utility, the issue of rates came up in the New York Court 
of Appeals because it was unclear whether Penn Central could 
keep its operations at Grand Central Station out of the red if it 
were forced to abandon the use of its air rights. Thus, if the 
building had been valued at market, the revenues were 
insufficient to allow Penn Central to make a decent rate of 
return.72 But if the size of the protected interest could be 
lowered, then the suitable return could be found off that 
smaller base.  
  
 71 Vicki Been & John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs: 
“Post-Zoning”?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 435 (2013). 
 72 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274-75 
(N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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In the New York Court of Appeals,73 the entire case was 
treated as a rate regulation matter.74 Judge Charles Breitel 
advanced the novel theory that the rates in question did not 
have to compensate the property owner for those additional 
values added solely by virtue of the benefits that the property 
owner received from its large locational advantages. He wrote 
that “a property owner is not absolutely entitled to receive a 
return on so much of the property value as was created by 
social investment.”75 He never bothered to note that the 
property owner contributed to that social investment by the 
payment of real estate taxes and by the positive contribution 
that its private investment in real estate improvements made 
to the overall neighborhood. Breitel’s logic plainly has bizarre 
implications, for if the city need not compensate for 
neighborhood advantages in a regulation setting, it need not 
compensate for them in an outright condemnation case, so that 
all landowners can recover at most a fraction of their value out 
of the property on condemnation. That suspect valuation 
standard leads, of course, to massive overcondemnation of 
property, which could then be sold off for a nifty profit, again at 
market rates. Any sensible approach recognizes that the 
particular landowner both receives and contributes to local 
values so that market valuation, at the very least, is necessary 
to prevent overcondemnation of properties.  
This goofy approach to rate regulation disappeared from 
view in the U.S. Supreme Court. What took place, however, 
was arguably worse. When the case was in the Supreme Court, 
Penn Central argued that the case had to do with the 
confiscation of a discrete property interest—namely, that in its 
air rights over Grand Central Station—for which it received 
nothing in return. In principle, a coherent theory of property 
rights should yield the same result regardless of which 
approach is taken. But in our politically charged world, Justice 
Brennan was keen to make sure that landmark preservation 
laws, which he noted were the norm throughout the United 
States, should not be struck down by judicial intervention.76 All 
  
 73 See generally id. 
 74 For a contemporary discussion of the New York Court of Appeals decision, 
see Richard Wollach, Penn Central v. City of New York: A Landmark Landmark Case, 
6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 667, 679-83 (1977). 
 75 Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1278. 
 76 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107 (“Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 
500 municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of 
buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic importance.” The rest of the passage 
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that remained was to determine how best to achieve that 
result. In this particular situation, he made many views, 
among the most egregious being that the improper equation of 
loss of property rights through direct regulation could not be 
attacked because it has “significantly diminished” the value of 
the property site.77 In order to sustain that equivalence, he 
made conscious reference to Justice Holmes’s decision in 
Pennsylvania Coal—to the effect that “[g]overnment hardly 
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could 
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law[]”78—and to an equally memorable quotation from 
Justice Robert Jackson’s famous decision in United States v. 
Willow River—to the effect that “this Court has dismissed 
‘taking’ challenges on the ground that, while the challenged 
government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere 
with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the 
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ 
for Fifth Amendment purposes.”79 In effect, the consequences of 
government regulation are treated similarly to those of 
diminution of property values attributable to competition, 
when, in reality, the two are polar opposites. Competition 
increases overall social wealth, while direct forms of regulation 
often diminish it. 
Nonetheless, Justice Brennan’s extensive dose of legal 
realism is intended to set up the punch line, which contains the 
very error that has infected takings law from the outset. It is, 
alas, necessary to repeat his critical passage: 
  
continues in laudatory fashion about the laws, with no reference to any of the possible 
disadvantages of historical preservation.) 
 77 Id. at 131. 
 78 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 79 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25. The exact passage in Willow River reads:  
It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value, and that the Company has 
an economic interest in keeping the St. Croix at the lower level. But not all 
economic interests are “property rights”; only those economic advantages are 
“rights” which have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized 
may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to 
compensate for their invasion.  
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). Justice Jackson 
does not explain which expectations are rights, and which ones are not. More 
concretely, he attaches no weight to the point that in a reasonable user regime, the 
protection of these mill interests is routine in private-law disputes. For further 
critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land 
and Water, in DANIEL H. COLE & ELINOR OSTROM, PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER 
RESOURCES 349-52 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1719254. 
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The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. 
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole,” . . . this Court, quite 
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining 
when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by 
public action be compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we 
have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will 
be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses 
proximately caused by it depends largely “upon the particular 
circumstances [in that] case.”  
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s 
decisions have identified several factors that have particular 
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant 
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A 
“taking” may more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, 
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.80 
For these purposes, it is critical to note that Justice 
Brennan makes the same (mistaken) use of Armstrong v. 
United States that was made 34 years later by Justice 
Ginsburg in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission. Instead of 
applying the on–off switch for the air rights, he denied that the 
needed clarity found in Armstrong was not achievable, so that 
“ad hoc” rules with balancing tests had to be invoked to deal 
with this situation. It is for that reason that the passage quoted 
from Armstrong81 was chopped up and surrounded with 
qualifiers insisting that it could not develop “a set formula” 
that would eliminate the need to make “ad hoc, factual 
inquires” under its well-known balancing test.82 And yet, little 
is said as to why this should be the case.  
The standard rule in these matters is that property 
rights are creatures of state law, not federal law. Thus, in New 
York, and virtually everywhere else, air rights are subject to 
full protection under state law. It is a trespass to build in the 
air space reserved to another. The owner has the right not only 
  
 80 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (first and fourth alterations in original) 
(citations omitted). 
 81 See supra notes 17 and 51 and accompanying text. 
 82 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24. 
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to use the air rights, but to sell them, subdivide them, give 
them away, and mortgage them. The overall efficiency of any 
property system depends on the ability to decompose larger 
interests into smaller ones, which will be done so long as the 
cost of that division is less than the gains generated by it. The 
correct response in all cases, therefore, is to insist that 
whatever interests created are protected against takings, lest 
the gains from that subdivision are threatened by government 
action that confiscates the air rights in whole or in part. 
Yet that was just what was done in Penn Central. 
Justice Brennan begins by noting—falsely—that the law of 
property looks at “the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax 
block designated as the ‘landmark site.’”83 From that one 
sentence it follows that so long as there is some residual value 
to the parcel as a whole, the destruction of any fractional 
interest is of no concern. As a result, these air rights are no 
longer protected even after they are purchased by a third party, 
which thereby injects a gratuitous uncertainty that 
systematically disrupts private transactions.  
At this point, Justice Brennan examined the role that 
TDRs played over other properties played in the overall 
analysis. No longer was it that they supply full and complete 
compensation for the air rights lost. Instead they were reduced 
to just one of the elements that went into the mix to decide 
whether a compensable taking took place: 
Although appellants and others have argued that New York City’s 
transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the New 
York courts here supportably found that, at least in the case of the 
Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these rights may well 
not have constituted “just compensation” if a “taking” had occurred, the 
rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens 
the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken 
into account in considering the impact of regulation.84 
One sign of intellectual sloppiness is to put quotation 
marks around terms that prove inconvenient, so as to be sure 
that they are not afforded their ordinary meaning. Justice 
Brennan denatures both the just compensation and the takings 
requirement by using just that tactic. In so doing, he abandons 
any notion that you first decide whether property rights have 
been taken and then ask whether compensation has been 
supplied. Under that approach, the loss of the use of the air 
  
 83 Id. at 130-31. 
 84 Id. at 137. 
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rights constitutes the taking. In Penn Central, however, New 
York City offered no cash compensation, so that compensation 
in-kind is supplied, if at all, through the TDRs. A correct 
measure demands that “the compensation must be a full and 
perfect equivalent for the property taken,”85 at which point the 
question is whether getting some air rights that might be 
exploited over some other property are equal in value to the air 
rights that, because of the taking, cannot be exploited over 
one’s own property. Justice Brennan does not even pretend 
that there is any equivalence in value. Rather, in the parallel 
universe of mere regulations, the sole purpose of the 
regulations is to “mitigate” the loss from a “taking,” which 
really hasn’t occurred anyhow.  
He makes no effort to calculate the size of this 
mitigation, which has to be small. There are no external 
negotiations needed to build over a site that one already owns, 
but there are extensive such negotiations that are required to 
build on other sites, along with a host of other regulatory 
requirements to be satisfied. The correct view constitutionally 
on this issue is to never allow the government to compensate in 
kind, except in those cases where the restrictions on one parcel 
are part of the same comprehensive scheme that supplies 
benefits to others. Thus, with a general set of height 
restrictions, the correct approach is to ask whether the overall 
value of the sites increases or not. If it does, no extra 
compensation is required because the integrated plan supplies 
the answer. Otherwise, cash is needed to make up the 
difference. But in this case, there is no necessary connection 
between the restrictions on the Penn Central site and the use 
of the TDRs anywhere else. The correct procedure, and the only 
one that leads to honest evaluations, requires New York to pay 
in cash for the loss of the development rights—which it would 
never do. It can then in a separate transaction auction off the 
TDRs to get some accurate sense of their market value, which 
is likely to be far less than the first sum.  
By way of analogy, let us assume that the state wants to 
condemn the development rights and pay for it with borrowed 
sums of money. One possibility is to give the financial paper to 
the condemnee. Its face value will of course equal that of the 
lost development rights. But a note is a complex instrument, 
and its interest coupons, maturity, collateral, and the like could 
  
 85 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). 
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easily influence its value. By forcing the state to sell off the 
notes to third parties, the amount the state can receive is 
limited to the fair market value of the paper, as evaluated by 
an independent party. That number will reflect both the 
interest rate and the riskiness of the note. Conversely, by 
forcing the condemnee to take that paper for the value the 
state assigns, it becomes impossible to gain evidence of its fair 
market value, as the state will low-ball valuation every time. 
The in-kind development rights discussed above permit that 
same kind of evasion. The point becomes clear when one looks 
at the rather paltry revenues that are generated from the sales 
of TDRs, as reported by Professor Been.86 It is surely better that 
these rights be sold in complex and cumbersome transfers than 
left idle. But the central point is that the convoluted scheme for 
regulatory takings has already sucked most of the value out of 
the system by making the false parallel between the air rights 
lost and those offered in exchange. The efficiency of this market 
can only be restored by reversing Penn Central’s bundling 
methodology, whose melding of the takings and compensation 
issues necessarily obscures all questions of valuation. The use 
of the correct procedure thus has this advantage. The taking of 
the air rights creates a per se obligation to compensate. The 
obligation to pay in cash, and not in TDRs, secures an honest 
valuation of the property taken. If both the takings and 
compensation elements are rightly done, the use of TDRs will 
no longer allow the state to engage in overcondemnation by the 
systematic practice of undercompensation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have sought to apply a unified theory of 
takings law to explain why all partial interests in real estate 
are entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as the 
outright ownership of land. The development of that unified 
approach eliminates the need to draw ad hoc lines to separate 
cases that by any rational economic analysis should receive the 
same treatment. The failure to grasp this one point thus leads 
the courts to turn somersaults in the vain effort to explain why 
compensation is awarded in some cases but denied in others. 
Further massaging of the new battle lines, such as that 
between permanent and temporary takings, will do nothing to 
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fix the fundamental weaknesses of the situation. Only a fresh 
conceptual start can save the current situation. 
That fresh start is a tall order. The question that 
necessarily arises is whether all the mistakes in doctrine really 
matter. And they do. In essence, the various methods of dealing 
with takings cases misprice all relevant assets. That is true in 
the flooding and the rent control cases, where the untenable 
line between temporary invasions or restrictions and 
permanent takings systematically reduces the scope of 
government regulation. It also happens in the general areas of 
land use regulation with the highly dubious use of TDRs as a 
means of compensation for property taken. In all these cases 
the losses to the owners are systematically understated or 
entirely ignored, which leads the government to take too much 
and to pay too little for what it takes. Nor are any of these 
government actions saved by pointing to some positive external 
effects of the rules now in place. With the various zoning 
ordinances, the obvious negative externalities—the broad class 
of common law nuisances—are off the table. So the social gains 
must arise, if at all, from various intangibles, dealing with such 
issues as aesthetics and views. It is not the case that these issues 
do not matter. But it is very difficult indeed to figure out which 
way they do matter. The construction of the Breuer Tower over 
Penn Central Station, for example, could have added another 
masterpiece to the New York City landscape. That unit would 
clearly have some positive externalities, along with possible 
negative externalities. It is not as though the construction of any 
building affects all persons in the neighborhood the same way. So 
it is with views. Some views may be blocked, but others are now 
created, and still others are enhanced.  
The common law judgment on all these variations was 
to ignore all these externalities because they point in no 
particular direction. That position is defensible on these 
grounds. First, the cost of intervention is very high, not only in 
terms of direct regulation but also in lost business 
opportunities. That is evident by looking at the extensive 
laundry list on Brad Lander’s agenda. Second, the external 
effects of these regulations are both positive and negative. 
There is little reason to think that new construction is 
systematically negative in its effects, and even less to think 
that some large negative exceeds the other gains from the 
construction in question. Other issues always remain, dealing 
with traffic flow and the like, but in the case of landmark 
preservation laws, these structures do not present any distinct 
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issue. The upshot, therefore, is that landmark designation, like 
other forms of innovative regulation, tends to contribute to 
local stagnation, not to local prosperity. The just compensation 
requirement of the Takings Clause, when not frittered away, 
puts some brake on that process. Its own rationing system 
helps bring the system back into alignment.  
There are, of course, other devices for land planning 
that remain even with a robust compensation requirement. 
First, the local government can condemn the air rights if it 
wishes to have them. It is virtually a moral certainty that no 
one in New York City would have made the needed 
appropriations from public funds to acquire—and retire—the 
air rights over the Penn Central terminal. The same is surely 
true with most other places in which regulations are put in place 
by government fiat. Second, private organizations can enter the 
market and buy up façades of structures that they wish to 
preserve, or acquire land that they could then put in trust for 
the desired purposes. None of these devices requires that 
condemnation be undertaken at bargain rates, and all of them in 
varying degrees may well operate to produce net social benefits.  
There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from the 
maintenance of the unhappy status quo. It involves these 
propositions. First, politicians will prosper as they grant favors 
to this group and that. Second, the successful interest groups 
will support the operation of the system. Third, no court will 
intervene to stop its operation. In the end, the very people who 
laud the system will wonder how it is that if their grasp of land 
use law and practice is so profound, the system can continue to 
slide into reverse. The post-zoning alternatives are too often 
proposed without taking into account the traditional pitfalls 
that follow whenever these takings questions are regarded as 
matters of degree rather than matters of kind. Unless the 
system is altered to reflect this one sound governance 
principle—the more the government takes by regulation or 
occupation, the more it should pay—the likely result is that the 
adoption of new techniques of land use regulation will follow 
the downward path of the earlier land use initiatives. 
